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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.
and W. Scott Henwood"
I.

INTRODUCTION

As you may know, July 11, 2010, marked the fiftieth anniversary of
Harper Lee's Pulitzer Prize-winning classic, To Kill A Mockingbird,'
which anecdotally inspired many in the South and beyond to enter the
legal profession. Therefore, it is fitting to open this Article with Atticus
Finch's oft-quoted closing statement:
The state has not produced one iota of medical evidence ... that the
crime 'Ibm Robinson is charged with ever took place ...
...

I am confident that you gentlemen will review without passion the

evidence you have heard, come to a decision, and restore this defendant
to his family. In the name of God, do your duty.
...

In the name of God, believe [Tom Robinson].'

This endearing work of literature encapsulates the importance of
evidence, which law students often accuse of being boring, but which is
the foundation ofjustice even for those whose property or life are at risk.

* Founding Partner in the firm of Hall, Booth, Smith &Slover, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
Mercer University (B.A., 1981); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
1984). Member, Mercer Law Review (1982-1984); Student Writing Editor (1983-1984).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Counsel for the firm of Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, P.C. Georgia State University
(B.B.A., 1976); Woodrow Wilson College of Law (J.D., 1978). Former reporter of decisions
for the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals.
1. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Harper Collins Publishers 50th anniversary
ed. 2010) (1960).
2. Id. at 231, 234.
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This Survey provides examples of evidentiary decisions made by
Georgia courts from June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2010.3 Some of the
decisions described below represent substantive changes in the law.
More of them illustrate ways that existing law can be applied to yield
different results.
II.

REVISION OF THE RULES

Attempts to align Georgia's evidence rules more closely with the
Federal Rules of Evidence have been delayed at least another year."
During the 2009 legislative session, the Georgia House of Representatives introduced House Bill 24,' which was designed to "revise, supersede, and modernize provisions relating to evidence.' On March 17,
2010, the bill passed the House Judiciary Committee, the scene of
previous resistance from legislators, but further consideration of the bill
was postponed until the 2010 session. The Senate did not vote on the
bill during this year's session.' A driving force behind these attempts
to amend portions of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)
that govern rules of evidence is the concern about the inconsistencies
created by "140 years of judicial gloss" of the statutory rules.' In some
cases, courts have abandoned the statutes all together and created
somewhat of a common law rule in a gradual rejuvenation of Georgia
law.10
III.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

"If an expert says it can't be done, get another expert." - David BenGurionn'

3. For analysis of Georgia evidence law during the prior survey period, see Marc T.
Treadwell, Euidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 135 (2009).
4. See generally Robert D. Ingram, Introduction,A BriefOverview ofthe ProposedNew
GeorgiaRules of Evidence, 13 GA. BJ. 30, 30 (Aug. 2007) (explaining attempts beginning
in 1986 to revise the Georgia rules).
5. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (2009) (unenacted).
6. Id
7. For an overview of the status history of Ga. H.R. Bill 24 see httpJ//www.legis.ga.
gov/legia/2009_10/sum/hb24.htm.
8. See supra note 5.
9. Paul S. Milich, A Brief Overview of the ProposedNew GeorgiaRules ofEvidence, 13
GA. B.J. 30, 31 (Aug. 2007).
10. Id
11.

ROSEMARiE JARSKI, WORDS FROM THE WISE: OVER 6,000 OF THE SMARTEST THINGS

EVER SAID 170 (2007).
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Qualifications

Great concerns have arisen in the past about the effect that the
development of the expert witness industry has had on our court
system. 2 These concerns contributed to the passage of O.C.G.A. § 24-967.1,3 which was enacted as part of Georgia's 2005 Tort Reform
package.14
Courts are continuing to define how this provision should be applied,
which has led to many opinions defining and redefining the provision's
role in qualification determinations for expert testimony. For an expert
to be qualified to testify, the expert must first meet a licensing
requirement" and a threshold of recent active practice in the specialty
of the allegedly negligent practitioner.e
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals provided some
insight into the scope of these requirements. In Craigo v. Azizi,"' the
trial court found the plaintiffs expert unqualified to testify that an
anesthesiologist breached the standard of care by administering general
anesthetic to the plaintiff before performing an interscalene nerve
block."e The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ultimate determination that the expert lacked sufficient qualifications, but the court of
appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding
that the expert's time spent working as a resident did not count toward
his active practice during three of the five years preceding the injury."9
The court established that once the expert received a medical degree and
began his residency, the clock started on "active practice" in his specialty
for purposes of the statute.2 0
Turning to licensing, the court interpreted O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(cys
requirement of licensure "by an appropriate regulatory agency to
practice ... in the state in which such expert was practicing .. . in the

12. See, e.g., Alfred R. Politzer, Georgia's Codification of Daubert: Narrowing the
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence in Georgia?,23 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 481, 487-88
(2006) (discussing the concern that judges face when presented with "novel scientific
evidence"); ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT's GUIDE TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE As APPLIED IN AMERicAN TRIALS 516 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing whether "junk
science" would be recognized in courts).
13. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (2010).
14. Ga. S. Bill 3, § 7, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 24 9-67.1).
15. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(cXl).
16. Id. § 24-9-67.1(cX2XA).
17. 301 Ga. App. 181, 687 S.E.2d 198 (2009).
18. Id. at 181-82, 687 S.E.2d at 199.
19. Id. at 185-86, 187, 687 S.E.2d at 202-03.
20. Id. at 185, 687 S.E.2d at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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profession" at the time of the alleged negligence" to mean that the
expert "must be licensed and practicing (or teaching) in one of the states
of the United States at the time the alleged negligent act occurred."'
Thus, no longer will parties be able to use experts licensed only in
Canada or Europe. Furthermore, where an expert is licensed at the time
of trial is immaterial.

B. Reliable Principlesand Methods
A qualified expert's testimony must also meet reliability criteria.'
The code provision, as recently amended by the Georgia Supreme Court,
requires proffered expert testimony to be based on reliable principles and
methods reliably applied to the facts of the case.'
The court of appeals recently applied the statute outside of the realm
of the medical malpractice case. In Giannotti v. Beleza Hair Salon,
Inc.,' a hair salon patron claimed that a stylist negligently performed
On appeal, the
hair-coloring procedures, causing chemical burns.'
court affirmed the exclusion of expert testimony on effects of haircoloring products on the following bases: the plaintiff's expert did not
perform tests using the same twenty-volume peroxide used by the
defendant; the peroxide used in the expert's tests was a different brand
than that used by the defendant; and the heat source used in the tests
differed from that used by the defendant. The court also noted that
the expert did not conduct any tests related to the effect of hair products
on human hair or skin." Therefore, the court reasoned that the expert
had not reliably applied his methods to the facts of the case.'
C.

The Expert's PersonalPractices
The previous Survey described how the Georgia Supreme Court settled
the question about the admissibility of a medical expert's personal
In Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, P C.,3 ' the
practice."

21. O.C.GA § 24-9-67.1(cXl) (emphasis added).
22. Craigo, 301 Ga. App. at 186-87, 687 S.E.2d at 203.
23. See O.C.GA § 24-9-67.1(cXl).
24. See Mason v. Home Depot U.SA, Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 658 S.E.2d 603 (2008) (finding
unconstitutional the portion of O.C.G.A § 24-9-67.1 that required the underlying facts to
serve as the basis of an expert's testimony and striking it from the code provision).
25. 296 Ga. App. 636, 675 S.E.2d 544 (2009).
26. Id. at 636-37, 675 S.E.2d at 545.
27. Id. at 640, 675 S.E.2d at 547.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Treadwell, supra note 3, at 146-48,
31. 285 Ga. 667, 681 S.E.2d 152 (2009).
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supreme court overruled previous case law and held that evidence of an
expert witness's personal practices is admissible as substantive evidence
to impeach the expert's testimony regarding the standard of care.a"
Last year, the court of appeals retroactively applied the holding in
Condra to Griffin v. Bankston," a dental malpractice case.34 The
plaintiff appealed the exclusion of her oral surgeon's deposition
testimony that his personal practice was to prescribe penicillin to
prevent infection when extracting impacted wisdom teeth. The plaintiff
wanted to use this testimony to impeach the dentist's statements at trial
that he did not believe administering the antibiotic would have been
effective in the plaintiff's case." The court of appeals noted that
equities favored retroactive application to prevent inconsistencies and to
avoid creating standards for cases that vary according to the date of
injury." Even though the expert was not offering his opinion about the
standard of care, the decision in Condra still applied.37 The court held
that in order to fully evaluate the witness's credibility, the jury should
have been allowed to hear evidence of the witness's personal practice."
IV.

RELEVANCY

SimilarActs or '1)ansactions
Evidence of past similar transactions by the defendant can be
admissible in Georgia.' However, it is difficult to determine exactly
when Georgia courts will find these extrinsic acts of the accused
relevant. Perhaps in an effort to provide clarity, the court of appeals
recently provided the following explanation of the admissibility
requirements:

A.

mhe State must show (a) sufficient evidence that the similar transaction occurred and (b) sufficient connection or similarity between the
similar transaction and the crime alleged so proof of the former tends
to prove the latter.... [Tihe proper focus is on the similarities, not

32. Id. at 669, 681 S.E.2d at 154 (overruling Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assocs.,
275 Ga. 240, 563 S.E.2d 431 (2002)).
33. 302 Ga. App. 647, 691 S.E.2d 229 (2009).
34. Id. at 650, 691 S.E.2d at 232.
35. Id. at 649, 691 S.E.2d at 231.
36. See id. at 650-51, 691 S.E.2d at 232-33.
37. Id. at 651, 691 S.E.2d at 233.
38. Id. at 652, 691 S.E.2d at 233.
39. See O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (2010).
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the differences, between the separate crime and the crime in question.'
In addition, courts must also consider whether the probative value of
evidence of other transactions outweighs the risk that the jury will
convict the defendant based on other proven examples of "bad acts"
rather than on evidence that the defendant committed the crime
currently alleged." Of course, these definitions do little to explain how
courts will decide whether transactions are substantially similar and
how they will weigh the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence. For
example, in a recent cocaine trafficking and possession case, the court
of appeals held that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the
defendant's admission to the arresting officer that he was on probation
for another cocaine-related offense." The court concluded that the only
possible evidentiary function that admitting evidence of an unspecified
prior offense involving cocaine could serve would be to "impugn" the
defendant's character." According to the court, this evidence was an
impermissible, tangential reference to the defendant's character."
However, the line between impermissibly impugning and incidentally
implicating a defendant's character has yet to be defined. The same
court upheld a trial court's decision to admit evidence of the defendant's
aggressive behavior and attempt to flee during a traffic stop ten years
earlier to show the defendant's pattern of running from the police and
assaulting police officers." The court also determined, however, that
the trial court incorrectly admitted the discovery of a powdery substance
in the defendant's vehicle the day after his arrest." The court reasoned that admitting the substance was error because no evidence
suggested the substance was illegal, and the defendant was not charged
with any drug-related offenses."'
It is clear that the rule permitting similar transaction evidence is most
liberally applied in criminal cases that involve sexual offenses-particularly offenses against children-to show that the defendant

40. Evans v. State, 300 Ga. App. 180, 182, 684 S.E.2d 311, 313-14 (2009).
41. See Hampton v. State, 300 Ga. App. 49, 49, 684 S.E.2d 118, 119 (2009) (quoting
Robinson v. State, 192 Ga. App. 32, 33, 383 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1989)); Farley v. State, 265
Ga. 622, 625, 458 S.E.2d 643, 646-47 (1995).
42. Hampton, 300 Ga. App. at 49, 684 S.E.2d at 119.
43. Id. at 50, 684 S.E.2d at 119 (quoting Robinson v. State, 192 Ga. App. 32, 34, 383
S.E.2d 593, 594 (1989)).
44. Id. at 49, 684 S.E.2d at 119 (quoting Robinson v. State, 192 Ga. App. 32, 33, 383
S.E.2d 593, 594 (1989)).
45. Ector v. State, 298 Ga. App. 847, 848-49, 681 S.E.2d 654, 657 (2009).
46. Id. at 848-49, 681 S.E.2d at 656-57.
47. Id. at 849, 681 S.E.2d at 657.
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has the "bent of mind" to engage in sexual encounters with unconsenting
victims." The court of appeals in Evans acknowledged a concern that
allowing extrinsic evidence to establish bent of mind may violate due
process, but it deferred to the supreme court's decision to deny certiorari
on that issue.4 9
B.

Victim Impact Evidence
In death penalty cases, Georgia law permits admission of evidence
about a victim's personal characteristics and the impact of the crime on
the victim, the victim's family, or the community "subsequent to an
adjudication of guilt." In Keita v. State,51 the supreme court examined this rule as it applied to the admissibility of a victim's funeral
program, which bore the victim's photograph on the cover." In Keita
the trial court permitted the State to introduce the front cover of the
victim's funeral pamphlet as proof of the victim's identity.53 The
program "contained a photograph of the victim [with the words] 'Home
Going Celebration,' a cross," the location of the service, and the name of
the bishop who conducted it." The defendant objected and argued on
appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the program cover." The
trial court determined, and the supreme court agreed, that the photograph's potential for prejudice was outweighed by its probative value.56
Although the court would have preferred to identify the victim in a
photograph without the funeral information, the court held no reversible
error was committed by admitting the photo that appeared on the
funeral booklet."
V. CHARACTER EVIDENCE

In an "evidentiary anomaly," Georgia law does not permit admission
of character evidence through the opinion of a character witness."
However, witnesses may testify about their knowledge of the defendant's

48. See Evans, 300 Ga. App. at 182, 684 S.E.2d at 313-14.
49. See id. at 183, 684 S.E.2d at 314 (citing Wade v. State, 295 Ga. App. 45, 47-49,670
S.E.2d 864, 865-68 (2008), cert. denied (2009)).
50. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2(aX1) (2008 & Supp. 2010).
51. 285 Ga. 767, 684 S.E.2d 233 (2009).
52. Id. at 767, 770, 684 S.E.2d at 234, 236.
53. Id. at 770, 684 S.E.2d at 236.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 771, 684 S.E.2d at 236.
57. Id.
58. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 765, 256 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1979).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

132

[Vol. 62

reputation in the community in which the defendant lives." The court
of appeals recently emphasized the specificity of this rule in Warner v.

State."
In a trial for armed robbery, the defendant called his high school
football coach as a character witness. The coach testified about the
defendant's reputation at school, but he indicated that he was not
familiar with the defendants reputation in the community in which he
lived. Jurors were instructed to disregard the testimony. On appeal,
the court affirmed the trial court's decision because on direct examination, questions about the character of the accused must refer to the
defendant's reputation in the community in which he lives: "Reputation
in the business community or in the school community is not the correct

test."62
Disputes about character evidence also concern what the jury should
do with the testimony that is admitted. The court of appeals recently
reversed a conviction after the trial court failed to properly instruct the
jury about the role of two witnesses' testimony about the defendant's
The judge granted the
positive reputation in the community.'
defendant's request for the pattern jury charge on good character
evidence, which read as follows:
Good character is a positive, substantive fact and may be sufficient to
produce in the minds of a jury a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
defendant. You have the duty to consider any evidence of general good
character along with all of the other evidence in the case, and, if in
doing so, you should entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
defendant, it would be your duty to acquit.6'
However, the judge instead instructed the jury that "good character of
the accused must be proved by evidence of the accused's reputation.
When evidence of good character is admitted, you may consider it in
determining whether or not you have a reasonable doubt about the guilt
of the accused."' The court of appeals held that this instruction misled
the jury into thinking that they may not need to consider the evidence
of the defendant's good character, by telling them that they "may"

59. Warner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 56, 63, 681 S.E.2d 624, 630-31 (2009) (quoting
Overby v. State, 125 Ga. App. 759, 760, 681 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1972)).
60. 299 Ga. App. 56, 681 S.E.2d 624 (2009).
61. Id. at 62-63, 681 S.E.2d at 630.
62. Id. at 63, 681 S.E.2d at 630-31.
63. Hobbs v. State, 299 Ga. App. 521, 523-24, 682 S.E.2d 697, 700 (2009).
64. Id. at 523 n.9, 682 S.E.2d at 699 n.9.
65. Id. at 523, 682 S.E.2d at 699-700.
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consider the evidence." Furthermore, the court held that the instruction failed to inform the jury that such evidence may be sufficient to
establish reasonable doubt.
VI.

A

HEARSAY

Generally

A Georgia statute defines hearsay as "that which does not derive its
value solely from the credit of the witness but rests mainly on the
This statute differs from
veracity and competency of other persons.'
the common definition that hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered
for the truth of the matter asserted.' However, the court of appeals
has interpreted the two definitions synonymously." According to their
application of the rule against hearsay, courts in Georgia seem to say
that hearsay is inadmissible unless the circumstances call for its
admissibility.7 ' The following sections provide examples of some of the
various hearsay admissibility determinations made during the survey
period.
B.

The Necessity Exception

Necessity is the hearsay exception that appears in O.C.G.A. § 24-31(b): "Hearsay evidence is admitted only in specified cases from
necessity."72 Evidence admitted under the necessity exception must
contain "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness[,] . . . and [must
show] that the hearsay statements are more probative and revealing
than other available evidence." If the statements are uncontradicted
and made by an unavailable witness to someone from whom the
declarant normally sought assistance with problems, then they are
admissible under the necessity exception."

66. Id. at 523, 682 S.E.2d at 700.
67. Id. at 523-24, 682 S.E.2d at 700 (quoting Nunnally v. State, 235 Ga. 693, 704-05,
221 S.E.2d 547, 554 (1975)).
68. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (2010).
69. See id.
70. See DI Unif. Servs., Inc. v. United Water Unlimited Atlanta, LLC, 254 Ga. App.
317,324,562 S.E.2d 260,266 (2002) (quoting Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865,867,294 S.E.2d
482, 484 (1982)) (interpreting the statutory definition of hearsay to mean statements made
out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted).
71. See Mills v. Bing, 181 Ga. App. 475, 477, 352 S.E.2d 798, 799 (1987).
72. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b).
73. Miller v. State, 283 Ga. 412, 414, 658 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2008).
74. Id.
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The supreme court recently held that statements made by a victim to
a neighbor before the victim was taken to a hospital qualified for the
necessity exception." In 'Readwell v. State,76 the key factors weighing in favor of admissibility related to the victim's relationship with the
neighbor. The victim was an eighty-one-year-old man who regularly
brought his mail to his neighbor to read to him." The two men often
shared meals made using vegetables from the victim's garden.78 For
the court, this relationship was sufficient to establish particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. 79
Similarly in Devega v. State," the supreme court upheld the trial
court's decision to admit statements made by the victim to his girlfriend
about a drug deal with the defendant."1 The court held that the
victim's statements satisfied the necessity exception because the victim
was deceased, and his statements were relevant to a meeting with the
defendant immediately preceding his death.82 These facts, coupled with
the romantic relationship between the defendant and the witness,
provided sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness for the court."

C.

Confrontation Clause

Hearsay admissibility determinations are often intertwined with
concerns about the defendant's Sixth Amendment" right to confront
the witnesses against him. In a recent case before the court of appeals,
Neal, an Augusta firefighter, appealed his termination on the grounds
that the personnel board should not have admitted the lab report of a
The court agreed with Neal."
random drug test into evidence.'
According to the court, Neal's confrontation right was not sufficiently
protected by allowing him to cross-examine the medical review officer
who reviewed the lab results because the officer testified merely as a
conduit for the absent technician's findings.87 Without sufficient

75. Treadwell v. State, 285 Ga. 736, 739, 684 S.E.2d 244, 248-49 (2009).
76. 285 Ga. 736, 684 S.E.2d 244 (2009).
77. Id. at 737, 740, 684 S.E.2d at 247, 249.
78. Id. at 740, 684 S.E.2d at 249.
79. Id.
80. 286 Ga. 448, 689 S.E.2d 293 (2010).
81. Id. at 449, 689 S.E.2d at 297.
82. Id
83. Id.
84. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
85. Neal v. Augusta-Richmond Cnty. Pers. Bd., 304 Ga. App. 115, 115,695 S.E.2d 318,
319 (2010).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 117-18, 695 S.E.2d at 321-22.
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guarantees of trustworthiness such as testimony about the accuracy or
methodology of the tests performed, the lab report was also inadmissible
hearsay and devoid of probative value.88
Statements of Co-conspirators
Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, Georgia law does not require
proof that a statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy before
admitting hearsay under the statement of co-conspirators exception."9
However, the statute containing the exception also contains an
introductory clause that requires the conspiracy to be proven before
statements of co-conspirators are admitted. 0 When confronted with an
opportunity to resolve the discrepancy between Georgia common law and
this code provision, the supreme court adhered to the case law.
In Thorpe v. State,"' the defendant appealed his convictions for
murder and related offenses stemming from an attempted robbery. The
contested evidence was a witness's testimony about a conversation he
participated in with the defendant and his codefendant in which they
admitted involvement in the murder.' The defendant argued that the
State failed to prove a conspiracy existed before offering the hearsay
testimony under the co-conspirators exception.' The court responded,
"Notwithstanding the first clause of the Code section, we have previously
held that such hearsay statements are admissible when the State at
some point before the close of evidence establishes a prima facie case of
Other
conspiracy independent of the co-conspirator statement. "9
the
between
an
agreement
testimony at trial sufficiently established
Because
the
robbery.'
defendant and two other individuals to commit
Georgia law defines a conspiracy only as "an agreement between two or
more persons to commit a crime," the State made a prima facie case of
conspiracy through evidence presented at various times and through

D.

88. See id. at 118, 695 S.E.2d at 322.
89. Milich, supra note 9, at 33. Under Rule 801(dX2)(E) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, "[a] statement is not hearsay if. .. t]he statement is offered against a party and
is . . . a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(dX2)(E).
90. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 (2010).
91. 285 Ga. 604, 678 S.E.2d 913 (2009).
92. Id. at 604-05, 678 S.E.2d at 916-17.
93. Id. at 609-10, 678 S.E.2d at 920.
94. Id. at 610, 678 S.E.2d at 920.

95. Id.
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various witnesses. 6 For the court, the timing was immaterial if the
conspiracy was proven."
VII. BURDEN OF PROOF
The supreme court held that another portion of the 2005 Tort Reform
package passed constitutional muster during the survey period. The
plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case challenged the heightened
requirement to prove negligence in claims arising out of emergency
medical care.9
The relevant statute provides that in instances of
alleged negligence during emergency medical care, "no physician or
health care provider shall be held liable unless it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the physician or health care provider's actions
showed gross negligence."
The court rejected the plaintiffs' claims
that the statute is an impermissible special law, that it deprives certain
plaintiffs of their right to a jury trial, and that it is unconstitutionally
vague.'9 8 Rather, the court held that heightening the evidentiary
standard was justified because rising health care costs in the state are
a sufficiently important problem, and the statute is reasonably related
to a solution to that problem.''
VIII. GUILTY PLEAS
In Boykin v. Alabama,'o the Supreme Court of the United States
established that in order for a guilty plea to stand, the defendant must
understand that he or she is waiving three constitutionally protected
rights," which are the privilege against self-incrimination,"o' the
right to trial by jury," and the right to confront one's accusers.ce
Moreover, to demonstrate the voluntariness of the plea upon the
accused's habeas petition, the State bears the burden of pointing either

96. Id. (quoting Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14, 15, 635 S.E.2d 723, 727 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
97. See id.
98. Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 8, 694 S.E.2d 75, 77 (2010).
99. O.C.GA § 51-1-29.5(c) (Supp. 2010).
100. Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 10-11, 13, 694 S.E.2d at 78-80.
101. See id. at 11-12, 694 S.E.2d at 79.
102. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
103. Id. at 243.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

105. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
106. Id.
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to evidence on the record of the guilty plea hearing or extrinsic evidence
if the record is silent.'0o

In Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Harrelson,"o the defendant's
plea hearing was not recorded, and the evidence of voluntariness was
preprinted forms signed by the defendant, in which she waived rights
The court settled a
and certified that the waiver was voluntary.'
conflict in Georgia case law, stating that preprinted forms such as these
are insufficient evidence that a guilty plea was offered voluntarily.1 o
IX. CONCLUsIoN
Atticus Fitch ideally believed that "[tihe one place where a man ought
to get a square deal is in a courtroom."" The evidence presented
before those who will ultimately make determinations of guilt, innocence,
or liability is a key component of achieving this fairness.
One may think that the statutory rules of evidence represent the final
word on a particular facet of the law. However, the cases described in
How a court decides
this Survey show that this is not always so.'
which evidence will and will not be heard within its walls can shape the
rule itself. Although efforts to conform parts of the O.C.G.A. to the
Federal Rules of Evidence are ongoing, the influence of court practice
will not likely change. Therefore, it is paramount to understand not only
the rules but also their practical application. Such understanding will
not only help predict what will be heard and seen by the trier of fact, but
it can help predict the outcome of disputes over properties and life.

107. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC v. Harrelson, 286 Ga. 665,666-67,690 S.E.2d 831,
833 (2010) (quoting State v. Hemdani, 282 Ga. 511, 511, 651 S.E.2d 734, 735 (2007)).
108. 286 Ga. 665, 690 8.E.2d 831 (2010).
109. Id. at 667, 690 S.E.2d at 833.
110. Id. at 667, 690 S.E.2d at 833-34. Contra Moore v. State, 285 Ga. 855, 856-58, 684
S.E.2d 605, 606-07 (2009) (contrasting examples of Georgia courts' treatment of preprinted
forms as evidence of the voluntariness of a guilty plea).
111. LEE, supra note 1, at 253.
112. See Milich, supra note 9, at 31 (describing the ways Georgia courts have created
various common law rules of evidence).

